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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between cultural and economic insecurity in post-
materialist and materialist countries. This is done using OLS regression to test whether the 
effect of different forms of insecurity on authoritarian attitudes differs between materialist and 
post-materialist countries. Whilst previous research has focused primarily on economic factors 
affecting democratic backsliding, this thesis argues that in societies where cultural questions 
dominate, other forms of existential insecurity may threaten democratic values. Using Ulrich 
Beck’s theories on the world risk society and reflexive modernization, it is argued that we are 
living in a time of greater cultural change and cultural risk. Individuals who feel heightened 
cultural insecurity may be more prone to favor authoritarian leadership at the expense of civil 
liberties. In materialist countries where economic values dominate, it is believed that the main 
sources of insecurity will stem from economic factors rather than cultural ones. Where 
economic questions dominate, support for authoritarian leadership is sought to protect material 
interests. Where cultural questions dominate, support for authoritarian leadership is sought to 
protect cultural interests. The results confirm that cultural insecurity influences authoritarian 
attitudes and that there is greater effect past a certain threshold of post-materialism. Economic 
insecurity has no effect in either materialist or post-materialist countries. At a certain threshold 
of post-materialism however, economic insecurity was a stronger predictor for authoritarian 
attitudes. Future research should develop more precise ways to measure subjective feelings of 
cultural and economic insecurity.  
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Introduction  
 
In recent years, several scholars have identified a trend towards democratic backsliding. 
Freedom House (2019) points to worldwide democracy in decline for 13 years. Larry Diamond 
(2015) has claimed we are witnessing a democratic recession and Gandhi (2018) has found that 
countries declining in democracy match those advancing in democracy. This trend is not limited 
to developing countries. Foa and Mounk (2016) found in their article on the democratic 
disconnect that trust in institutions, voter turnout and party identification has decreased in well-
developed democracies. Using WVS data they found that support for the democratic system, 
not just the government, has decreased especially amongst youth. Although no well-developed 
democracies have yet turned authoritarian, the trends identified could point to a ‘hallowing’ 
democracy (Greskovits, 2015). Greskovits argues that this hollowing out is identified by 
declining turnout, less citizen identification, volatility and the atrophy of party relationships 
with civil society, similar to the results from Foa and Mounk (2016). Rather than there being 
an immediate shift to authoritarianism, it is more likely that developed democracies slowly and 
gradually backslide. This is further supported by Waldner and Lust (2018), who argue that what 
we are likely to witness and should pay attention to is incremental changes. Somer and McCoy 
(2018) look at polarization and argue that this has created different expectations from 
democracy which has triggered clashes between groups who seek to be represented and 
deepened the democratic crisis. For them, new and changing cultural values are often related to 
the terms of division in polarized societies.  
 
This thesis seeks to look deeper into what the possible mechanisms behind increasing support 
for authoritarian rule in traditionally stable democracies are. This is done by analyzing how 
economic insecurity and cultural insecurity affect authoritarian attitudes in materialist and post-
materialist countries. Using modernization theory based on Inglehart, as well as Beck’s theories 
on reflexive modernization and the world risk society, it is argued that post-materialism has 
been treated as a phenomenon that is independent of the context it exists in. Modernization 
theory stipulates that post-materialism is conducive to democratic development and is created 
through existential security. For modernization theory, this is economic security and it allows 
individuals to place value in questions that are cultural rather than economic. However, what is 
not discussed in modernization theory is what possible new sources of existential threat post-
materialist societies are vulnerable to, and whether new forms of existential insecurity can 
affect democratic values. With the help of Beck’s world risk theory, the concept of cultural 
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insecurity is formed. Through globalization and the blurring of boundaries in most aspects of 
life, whether this be political, economic, or social, there are less certain truths in society. It is 
argued that this may create a new insecurity that post-materialists, who identify themselves 
through culture rather than economy, are more susceptible to feel. This cultural insecurity may 
lead individuals who are faced with a new perceived existential threat relating to their identity 
to form ‘risk consciousness’. That is, to ensure their own security, they are willing to infringe 
on civil liberties.  
 
Research questions 
- To what extent are attitudes towards authoritarian alternatives in post-materialist 
countries more greatly affected by cultural insecurity over economic insecurity? 
- To what extent are attitudes towards authoritarian alternatives in materialist countries 
more greatly affected by economic insecurity over cultural insecurity? 
 
Hypotheses  
- In post-materialist countries, cultural insecurity will be more influential than economic 
insecurity on holding authoritarian views. 
- In materialist countries, economic insecurity will be more influential than cultural 
insecurity on holding authoritarian views.  
 
The hypotheses are answered using OLS regressions with WVS data measuring authoritarian 
attitudes, economic and cultural insecurity and are tested separately with level of post-
materialism as an interaction variable.  
 
Disposition 
The thesis is structured as follows; the literature review is followed by a theoretical discussion. 
After this, the empirical analysis and methodology is explained, followed by the results, 
analysis and concluding remarks.  
Literature review 
This section focuses on the qualities of post-materialism and why democratic backsliding may 
be triggered by different sources of insecurity depending on these qualities. Post-materialism 
per the literature has two main different understandings. For Inglehart and Welzel (2005) post-
materialist values are the result of generational change in levels of existential security. 
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According to Welzel’s (2013) utility ladder, as individuals grow accustomed to greater 
existential security the sacred loses authority, this in turn creates a greater sense of autonomy.  
A desire for the freedom to act on this autonomy is thereby created which then motivates the 
demand for democracy. The demand for democracy created by this shift in security is 
operationalized by Welzel as emancipative values. These values are regarded as the 
‘psychological bedrock of pro-democratic mass culture’ (Deutsch & Welzel, 2016, s. 563). 
Inglehart bases his theory on a similar logic, as younger generations grow up with greater 
prosperity and peace, their needs transition from materialist basic needs to post-materialist self-
actualizing needs which he refers to as ‘self-expression values’ (Inglehart, 1977) . Over time, 
higher priority is placed on values of freedom of speech, self-expression, emancipation and 
autonomy.   
 
Whilst post-materialist values are primarily described as positive changes for Inglehart and 
Welzel, other scholars have argued that post-materialism can also create ‘uncivic’ attitudes. 
Flanagan and Lee (2003) posit that post-materialism and its subsequent individualism creates 
self-serving individuals who are unwilling to make sacrifices and that this will lead to self-
interested politics. For Putnam (1993) this too holds true; he argues that individualism is part 
of what drives the decline of social capital. Flanagan and Lee (2003) argue post-materialism 
leaves authority with the individual, meaning that truth becomes relative and that moral 
principles are ruled by personal preferences. Post-materialism for these authors implies 
primarily the autonomy of the self and the use of others for personal gain. Gustavsson (2012) 
on the other hand argues that emancipative values measure different dimensions of freedom 
and bases her analysis on Isaiah Berlin. Gustavsson claims that the way post-material cultural 
changes are viewed depends on a notion of freedom and that both positive and negative freedom 
can be captured depending on how we measure these values. Negative freedom is anti-
authoritarian and values relativism whereas positive freedom relates to an inner freedom 
focusing on autonomy, authenticity and self-realization. Flanagan and Lee can be said to have 
based their analysis on a conceptualization of negative freedom whereas Inglehart and Welzel 
have an understanding based on positive freedom. It may therefore be necessary to identify 
what triggers unicivic or civic attitudes to understand democratic backsliding in developed 
democracies.   
 
Research made with attempts to resolve the differences in understanding what post-materialism 
implies has had mixed results. With regards to pro-social behavior, Welzel, Thöni, and Kistler 
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(2017) find that individuals with high emancipative values had higher rates of altruism 
measured through donations and public goods contributions. Secular values on the other hand 
had weaker correlations with altruistic attitudes. Welzel, Kratsoia and Oschpokvo (2017) look 
at how post-materialists view bribery, they find that on an individual level there is no linear 
relationship between post-materialism and views on bribery. On the country-level, post-
materialists were more positive towards bribery in the case that a majority in the country were 
not post-materialists. This is argued to be an effect of social pressures, with more post-
materialists, certain behaviors are less accepted than others. Thus, a society with widespread 
post-materialist values sees a weaker relationship between these values and views on bribery. 
Similar to the effect of widespread post-materialism values, Welzel (2010) finds that the more 
altruistic understanding of self-expression holds true in the case that a society has an abundance 
of self-expression values on the country level. His results indicate self-expression values have 
a strong association with in and out group trust, high levels of social capital and collective 
action. Flanagan and Lee (2003) on the other hand, find using data from the 1990’s wave that 
post-materialists have lower levels of life satisfaction due to higher expectations. They are also 
less trusting of institutions, and feel alienated whilst also being more politically engaged. The 
contradiction of both feeling alienated but more politically engaged is believed to be since post-
materialists are more engaged in elite challenging movements that fit their ‘narrowly defined 
self-interest’ (Flanagan & Lee, 2003, s. 267). This contrasts with being engaged in more 
mainstream political movements.  
 
Based on these findings it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about post-
materialism. On the individual level, it seems that these can increase uncivic behavior. 
However, when post-materialism is widespread in a country the civic nature of post-materialism 
increases instead. This suggests there is a duality within post-materialism and this duality is 
dependent on how widespread post-materialism is. That said, civic values, such as civic 
activism, democratic support and generalized trust have recently been decreasing in societies 
where you have widespread post-materialism (Foa & Mounk, 2016) . Given these values are 
part of what forms the ‘psychological bedrock’ (Deutsch & Welzel, 2016, s. 563) of democracy 
it is problematic that we cannot explain well enough how they are affected. Uncivic post-
material values could be a cause of the polarization identified by Somer and Mccoy (2018). 
They find that polarization based on different understandings and expectations of democracy 
has led to a crisis where you have democractic loyalists and cynics who are polarized over 
different discourses and identities. Using Flanagan and Lee’s (2003) conceptualization of post-
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materialism or Gustavsson’s (2012) negative freedom, the polarization seen which is leading to 
a democratic crisis could be attributed to a surge in self-interested politics or the uncivic side 
of post-materialism.  
 
This thesis proposes that there may be causes of perceived existential insecurity which are not 
economic that societies with post-material values are more vulnerable too. In instances where 
post-materialists are confronted with existential insecurity, there may be an increase in self-
serving attitudes which may threaten established democracies. The next section will expand on 
this and identify which possible sources of existential insecurity can be prominent in post-
material society and how these may affect civic values. 
Theory 
Inglehart and Welzel’s views on existential insecurity stem from Inglehart’s scarcity and 
socialization hypothesis (1977). As an individual grows up, their goals reflect what is scarce in 
their lives. For Inglehart this is understood as economic scarcity. When material goods are 
scarce, individuals face an economic existential insecurity which prevents them from seeking 
goals which are not materialistic. Similarly, Welzel’s (2013) idea of the utility ladder argues 
that to crave emancipation, individuals need economic security. The socialization hypothesis 
implies that value change arising from existential security is slow moving, thus changes are 
seen across generations and not in one lifespan.  
 
The perspective this thesis takes is that sources of existential insecurity depend on what is 
valued in a society. In materialist societies where economic security is most valued this will 
also be regarded as the greatest threat. In post-material societies, culture and identity have risen 
in importance. This is reflected in political scales that no longer divide parties or politicians as 
economic right and left wing, but rather in liberal/authoritarian dimensions. Possibly this may 
mean that post-materialists are more affected by cultural existential insecurity rather than 
economic existential insecurity. If cultural security is scarce, and new generations are socialized 
within this scarcity this may impact post-material values. What is suggested is not a backlash 
which implies reverting back to a traditional understanding of values but rather that cultural 
insecurity triggers another side of post-materialism. The duality of post-materialism may be 
explained by the extent to which an individual feels culturally secure. The idea that threats to 
post-materialism are not limited to economic security has also been proposed by Robert Brym 
(2016). In his paper on trends in the USA, China and Russia, he argues that insecurity is based 
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on a ‘reorientation of the international system’ which has triggered value change. This indicates 
that other sources of threats may have been overlooked. To place the idea of alternative 
existential insecurity within a theoretical framework, Beck is used to analyze post-material 
countries and help identify how cultural insecurity may be perceived as potentially risky.  
 
For Beck (2003), developed countries are going through reflexive modernization. He argues 
this is the radicalization of modern society. In the new reflexive society, things that were taken 
for granted such as class culture, welfare, tradition, and gender roles no longer are secure. 
Reflexive modernization, however, differs from post-modernization. Rather than just looking 
at how social structures are being deconstructed, it seeks to answer what, instead, is taking the 
place of previously stable social constructs. As modernization has progressed, so has 
globalization. This has undermined the economic foundations of the nation state, the loosening 
of borders has impacted the political and cultural foundations, and thus, social structures have 
changed. Without the same economic foundations, the welfare state loses legitimacy. 
Simultaneously, the universality of freedom and increased equality changes gender roles, whilst 
a lack of social security affects the traditional family structure. For Beck, the loss of these 
traditional forms of community; the nation state, religion, workplace, or family, forces 
individuals to seek new forms of community. Modernization theory places these new forms of 
engagement in a solely positive light i.e. environmental groups, or female rights activists. Beck, 
instead, highlights how the deconstruction of social structures also has the potential of creating 
more controversial structures.  
 
Individuals in reflexive modernization are faced with uncertainties. In the process of creating 
new stable social structures, individualization means that all possible choices can be deemed 
legitimate. In this vacuum of boundaries, new boundaries can be redrawn and changed to fit 
one’s identity. This applies also to expert knowledge; boundaries are blurred. Through 
technological advancements, it is possible for knowledge to be democratized, and in that, it 
becomes more important for all voices to be heard rather than to identify truth. In the context 
of reflexive modernization, individualization and relativism can be a source of insecurity. In 
contrast to Inglehart, Beck demonstrates how these aspects rather undermine than support 
democracy.  
 
The uncertainties of reflexive modernization also mean that we are living in a risk society 
(Beck, 2006). These two aspects together can help explain how the process of democratic 
 11 
backsliding is possible. In Beck’s reflexive modernity, threats have been reduced. These threats 
can be considered synonymous to the material existential insecurity of which Inglehart speaks. 
What Beck, however, argues we have instead today, which is overlooked in modernization 
theory, is risk. Through modernization we can reduce threats such as disease and anticipate 
natural disasters such as floods. However, with technological advancements we have created 
new risks. Given the increased accessibility to knowledge, the responsibility lies with the 
individual to navigate which risks are worth taking. With the blurring of boundaries between 
what is fact and fiction it is difficult for individuals to make such decisions. The world risk 
society therefore deals with ‘debating, preventing and managing risks it itself created’ (Beck, 
2006, s. 332). 
 
The breaking down of social constructs through reflexive modernization and increased 
awareness of risks create an environment of uncertainty. The lack of trust in knowledge, 
authority, and loss of tradition in both the work environment and family life leaves individuals 
to create their own truths. The lines of division however are with risk rather than class; the 
drawing of new boundaries and creation of new communities compete over risk. The goal is to 
become socially secure in an insecure world. The boundaries created by one group or individual 
can pose a risk to another’s. For example, women’s rights movements defined boundaries as to 
who was included in the struggle and sought to minimize risk for its members. In response, 
men’s rights activists have started emerging that see women’s rights as a risk to themselves. 
They draw their own boundaries in the hopes of minimizing the risk of losing social status and 
power. For Beck, this implies that individualization deepens in the risk society and creates new 
asymmetries. In time, this can form what Beck calls the ‘risk consciousness’ (Beck, 2006, s. 
341) . In the vacuum of the state and truth, the anticipation of risk may lead individuals to seek 
remedies, or support the new drawing of boundaries, that infringe on civil liberties in turn for 
security.   
 
As Ingelhart (2008) argues, the political map for post-materialists with regards to lines of 
conflict are along cultural dimensions rather than economic ones ‘..as Post-materialists became 
more numerous they would bring new issues into politics and declining social class conflict’ 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Simultaneously, risk has created new inequalities in globalized 
societies. New identity based groups increase in importance and size in the political sphere, 
further deepening inequalities based on cultural signifiers. Risk to one’s self-created identity 
becomes the inequality signifier rather than class. Groups may then seek to increase cultural 
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capital so that their interests are the most accepted and represented to ensure risk minimization. 
In the ‘liberal/authoritarian’ dimensions in political maps, the liberal dimension can fall into 
what Ingelhart defines as ‘post-materialism’, whilst the authoritarian side is regarded as the 
reactionary, traditional backlash side (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Based on Beck, however, it is 
argued that the authoritarian side is not necessarily a backlash but a different understanding of 
risk. For those on the liberal side, the greatest risk may relate to the environment, gender, or 
racism whereas for the other side risks may relate to immigration, crime or law and order. These 
risk groups are formed based on different interpretations of reality as they exist in societies 
where social relativism dominates. 
 
 Modernization theory as proposed by Inglehart was developed in the 1970’s, prior to the extent 
of globalization and technological advancements we have today. The cultural changes predicted 
may have been accurate in what post-materialists under those circumstances would develop. 
However, with decreasing universal truths, individuals create their own post-materialist values 
which also reflect a questioning of the dominant status quo. These alternative values possibly 
held by post-materialists may also reflect self-actualization and emancipation even if they do 
not fit into the index proposed by Inglehart. At the time of Inglehart’s original thesis, post-
materialism implied opposition towards traditional values, gender inequality, or discrimination. 
Today gender equality and inclusion are instead dominant cultural values in most developed 
societies, thus, being relativistic or insubordinate today as a post-materialist may mean going 
against these values.  Whilst opposing egalitarianism may not be regarded as such, it can still 
be an expression of self-actualization and of risk minimization for some. This would mean 
authoritarian development does not necessarily indicate individuals are more traditional. Rather 
they are post-material in a different sense with a different risk consciousness.  
 
The development of authoritarian attitudes may reflect this heightened risk consciousness. 
Certain groups may be more susceptible to value authoritarianism as a source of security. Whilst 
most previous research looks to economic explanations for these trends, based on the theories 
put forward by Beck and the logic of post-materialism, this thesis asks whether cultural 
insecurity is instead the main factor driving post-materialists in developed democracies to 
question the democratic system. In post-material societies where cultural questions dominate 
these risks may be related cultural questions rather than economic ones. Certain groups or 
individuals may have a different interpretation of cultural risk, participate in self-actualizing 
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movements in support of this interpretation, and be willing to give up civil liberties in exchange 
for risk minimization.  
 
The implications of this argument are that the core of post-materialism relates to 
individualization which is also supported in Beck’s theories. However, rather than arguing that 
post-materialism is either altruistic or self-serving, it is suggested that depending on the extent 
of risk felt post-materialists can be either self-serving or altruistic. Increased relativism and 
skepticism, which Beck identifies as the main sources of cultural insecurity in reflexive 
modernized societies, can possibly lead to support for authoritarian sources of security. The 
democratic backslide identified by Foa and Mounk may be explained by the fact that younger 
individuals are growing up in heightened cultural insecurity. Depending on how they view 
cultural risk relative to their identity, it is possible this will also affect how secure they feel with 
the political system governing them.  
 
To test this, measures for cultural insecurity and economic insecurity are used as independent 
variables. To see whether the reflexive modernization/post-materialist hypothesis holds, post-
materialism is used as an interactive variable, and attitudes towards authoritarianism as the 
dependent variable. In the case that the hypothesis holds, cultural insecurity should be more 
influential on autocratic attitudes than economic insecurity in post-materialist countries. In 
materialist countries, the question of cultural risk will be less important, leaving economic 
questions to dominate attitudes towards autocracy.   
 
Empirical Analysis 
OLS regression models are used to test the relationship of economic and cultural insecurity on 
authoritarian attitudes using the post-materialism score as an interaction variable. This post-
materialism moderator is used to indicate whether the effect of either cultural or economic 
insecurity increases or decreases given the level of post-materialism. The results from the 
analysis should point to which of the IV’s is best at predicting authoritarian attitudes and 
whether this relationship is affected by how post-materialist the country is. The data for the 
IV’s, DV and interaction variable are continuous and collected from the most recent WVS from 
2010-2013 (World Value Surveys, 2011) and is aggregated to capture country level scores. 
Based on the theory and subsequent hypotheses, we should expect that greater cultural 
insecurity has a greater positive effect on authoritarian values in countries with high levels of 
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post-materialism, and that greater economic insecurity has a greater positive effect on 
authoritarian values in countries with lower levels of post-materialism.  
 
Independent Variables 
This study uses two independent variables and tests their effects in separate OLS regressions. 
Both independent variables are collected and aggregated from the latest WVS dataset. The 
variables are all recoded if needed so that higher scores indicate higher levels of insecurity.  
 
Cultural Insecurity1 
Relativism 
Given the lack of research and existing ways to operationalize the concept, an index was created 
to measure cultural insecurity. This sought to capture cultural insecurity as defined by Beck. 
The index was created using the WVS scores for ‘Relativism’ and ‘Scepticism’. The two 
variables were chosen to represent Beck’s ideas as the reflexive modernization theory argues 
that cultural insecurity is created through a loosening of truth, that is relativism, and a distrust 
for experts and authority, that is, scepticism. Problematic with the index was the low 
Cronbach’s Alpha score, at 0.173. This indicates that the two variables used to form the index 
are barely correlated.  
 
Whilst a comprehensive index capturing several aspects would have been ideal, given the weak 
Cronbach’s Alpha, this was not possible. The variables were tested separately with authoritarian 
attitudes, and the strongest of the variables was chosen as the operationalization for cultural 
insecurity. Thus, relativism is the independent variable representing cultural insecurity. The 
‘relativism’ (Welzel C. , 2013) index is taken from the WVS Secular index, and is formed based 
on attitudes towards sacred sources of authority in the normative domain. These are anti-
bribery, anti-cheating, and anti-evasion. Here a score of 1 signifies higher levels of relativism, 
that is more positive attitudes towards bribery, cheating and evasion. Seeing as this is a new 
concept it is difficult to find variables better suited for the concept as described by Beck. 
Relativism captures how individuals regard normative certainties in societies, people who are 
vulnerable to the changes described in reflexive modernization and the world risk society are 
arguably more likely to regard such rules as subjective. Rather than abide by societal rules they 
may depend on internal authority and abide by individual moral codes. This, by extension, may 
                                                     
1 For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2 
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also apply to opinions on regimes, and is possibly heightened among post-materialists who 
value their individual opinions greater than in traditional societies.  
 
Economic Insecurity2 
The second independent variable represents economic insecurity. Given that this thesis looks 
at subjective feelings of insecurity, the question ‘Worries: Losing your job or not finding a job’ 
is used to operationalize economic insecurity. Being worried about keeping your job or not 
finding one, should indicate that the individual is concerned about their economic situation. 
 
Moderating Variable 
Post-materialism3 
Inglehart’s 12-item measure for post-materialism is used as the moderating variable. The reason 
this measure is chosen rather than the 4-item measure for post-materialism is because this is 
deemed by Inglehart (1990) to be less susceptible to short term changes, and a better predictor 
for stable post-materialism values as it taps into long-term aims. The questions included here 
are on the aims for the country for the next 10 years, and on what is most important for the 
country. Answers include options such as protecting freedom of speech or maintaining order in 
the nation, where freedom of speech would be deemed as a post-materialist answer. In countries 
where more respondents chose options that relate stronger to cultural values rather than 
economic or security values, they are more post-materialist. As an interaction variable, it is 
included in the model in combination with one of the independent variables to give the effect 
of the IV’s given higher levels of post-materialism. This is done by multiplying the post-
materialism variable by each of the IVs separately and creating a new interaction variable. 
Whilst the separate IV’s influence authoritarian attitudes, and post-materialism influences 
authoritarian attitudes, the main point of interest here is the effect of post-materialism on the 
effect of the IV’s.  
 
Dependent Variable 
Authoritarian Attitudes4 
This index is formed by combining responses to three questions from WVS looking at political 
systems. These are attitudes towards political systems with strong leaders who do not have to 
                                                     
2 For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2 
3 For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2 
4 For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2 
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bother with parliaments and elections, political systems where the army rules, and political 
systems where experts not governments make decisions. These are the same questions used by 
Foa and Mounk (2016) to look at increasing authoritarian attitudes which suggests that these 
are also suitable for this thesis. Important with these questions is that they tap into regime 
satisfaction rather than government satisfaction. The Cronbach’s Alpha here is 0.654 which is 
not very strong but still an acceptable score. The reason why it may be slightly weak could be 
that the concept of authoritarianism here is very broad and looks at all forms of non-democratic 
support. Individuals who support expert governments may not be supportive of army rule, but 
they would still fall under authoritarian attitudes.  
 
Control Variables 
Standard control variables are used such as GDP per capita and are collected from the World 
Bank (reference). The GDP per capita used is the average of 3 years, 2010-2013 to capture the 
time span in the WVS surveys. GDP per capita is correlated with post-materialism, with post-
materialist countries often having higher GDPs (Inglehart, 1999). Polity IV (2010) scores are 
used to control for regime type which could influence authoritarian attitudes, countries with 
strongman leadership for example may be more prone to see it as a positive political system. 
The percentage of Muslims collected from the Pew Research Center (2009) in a country is also 
used which is common in social science research given its negative correlations with democratic 
regimes (Norris, 2013). Finally ethnic fractionalization taken from the Alesina et al. (2003) 
dataset is used. This confounder is included in the model to control for the possibility that 
increased cultural insecurity and the increase in authoritarian values may be due to an increased 
heterogeneity in traditionally homogenous European and Western states. A caveat with this 
control, however, is that Alesina et al.’s measures are from 2003, thus recent migration flows 
for example that can have affected ethnic compositions are not captured. The regressions were 
therefore also tested using the more recent Social Diversity Index from Okediji (2011). 
However, many countries were missing from the Okediji dataset and SDI was insignificant, 
thus it was not included in the final models.   
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Table 1: Variable Descriptives 
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
DV: 
Authoritarian 
attitudes 
55 6.5 0.84 4.8 8 
IV: Cultural 
insecurity  
55 0.37 0.12 0.14 0.66 
IV: Economic 
insecurity 
55 2.8 0.46 1.9 3.6 
Moderator: Post-
materialism 
55 1.9 0.37 0.9 2.8 
 
The above table gives an overview on the key variable information for each of the IV’s, DV 
and moderator variable. Data was found for each of the variables for 55 countries5. 3 countries 
were removed as outliers, Haiti, Morocco and Egypt which had scores far outside the 
interquartile range. Kuwait and Qatar were removed from the data set as they had missing 
information on authoritarian attitudes and cultural insecurity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 For a full list of countries included see appendix 1 
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Preliminary Analysis 
 
Figure 1: Cultural insecurity and                                        Figure 2: Economic insecurity and 
authoritarian attitudes.                                                        authoritarian attitudes 
 𝑅2 = 0.090                                                                         𝑅2 = 0.015                                            
 
 Figure 3: Post-materialism and 
authoritarian attitudes. 𝑅2 = 0.042 
 
Based on the above figures, it is 
possible to see that cultural insecurity 
has a greater effect on authoritarian 
attitudes than economic insecurity, 
which gives some support for the 
theory. We can also see that post-
materialism has a negative relationship 
with authoritarian attitudes, implying 
that the more post-materialist a country 
is, the less likely authoritarian attitudes are prevalent which would support previous research. 
The graphs above, however, do not indicate whether the level of post-materialism influences 
the impact of the independent variables. To better illustrate the relationship with the interaction 
variable, a dummy post-materialism variable was plotted in the scatter graphs. A score of 1 
signifies post-materialism above 2 (plotted in green), and 0 signifies post-materialism below 2 
(plotted in blue).  
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Figure 4: Cultural insecurity and                                    Figure 5: Economic insecurity and  
authoritarian attitudes.                                                authoritarian attitudes.  
Post-mat 1: 𝑅2 = 0.276                                                                           Post-mat 1: 𝑅2 = 0.138 
Post-mat 0: 𝑅2 = 0.017                                                Post-mat 0: 𝑅2 = 0.014 
 
 
In these plots, we can see that post-materialism does indeed impact the effect of the independent 
variables. In comparison to the prior plots, the 𝑅2 is stronger. This indicates that levels post-
materialism influence the strength of the independent variables. Further, for all variables, being 
a highly post-materialist country increases the explanatory variables predicting power. From 
the hypotheses, we expected the cultural insecurity effect on authoritarian values to increase 
with increased post-materialism. Plot 4 suggests that this may be the case. That said, the 
hypotheses also expected the effect of economic insecurity to have a greater effect on 
authoritarian attitudes in less post-materialist countries. Plot 5 suggests that this is not the case. 
Rather than seeing economic insecurity affecting authoritarian attitudes more in materialist 
countries we see the opposite. Contrary to the hypothesis, greater economic insecurity in 
materialist countries in fact decreases authoritarian attitudes. These results give some indication 
as to what to expect, however for a more robust analysis OLS regression is used to give us 
information about which of these relationships is significant and whether the relationships hold 
with an interaction variable and more controls.  
 20 
Regression Models 
In designing the regression models, data is taken from the 2010-2013 WVS survey wave. New 
variables were created for the independent, dependent and moderating variables and then 
aggregated from the individual level to the country level. For the interaction variable, the 
independent variables and post-materialism variable were mean centered. This was done to 
avoid multicollinearity which could affect the models. The interaction term was formed by 
multiplying the mean centered independent variable with the mean centered post-materialism 
variable. It was decided to keep it as a continuous variable to capture greater variation and 
produce more robust results. The regressions were also repeated using post-materialism as 
dummy variable to identify if there were any threshold effects6. Two separate regressions were 
run for each independent variable, each regression included five models. The first including the 
centered IV, the second adding the centered moderating variable, the third adding the centered 
interaction term, the fourth includes all control variables, and the final fifth model includes the 
other independent variable. It is difficult to establish causality through this cross-sectional 
method, and it would have been preferable to include time series data. Time series data would 
have been better in establishing a cause and effect sequence, it is also possible that the effects 
of cultural insecurity are slow moving which would imply that this would only affect 
authoritarian attitudes in the long term. The results however should inform us of whether the 
independent variables are influenced in their effect by post-materialism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 For regression results using dummy variable see appendix 4 
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Results7 
 
Table 2: Cultural insecurity regression results 
 Cultural insecurity effect on authoritarian attitudes. Unstandardized B-coefficients. Standard 
error in parentheses. Dependent variable: Authoritarian attitudes index. 
* Denotes significance at 95%  
**Denotes significance at 98%  
*** Denotes significance at 99% 
 
The results tell us that cultural insecurity based on Beck’s understanding has a significant and 
strong effect on the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes in all five models and regardless of 
level of post-materialism. Post-materialism on the other hand as predicted has a negative effect 
on authoritarian attitudes. The interaction term however affects authoritarian attitudes in the 
expected positive direction, and the effect of cultural insecurity in countries with greater post-
materialism is stronger, however the interaction term was not significant in any of the models. 
                                                     
7 For regression and multicollinearity results see appendix 3  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Cultural 
insecurity 
(Beck) 
1.976* 
(0.880) 
2.111**  
(0.867) 
2.256** 
(0.889) 
1.918* 
(0.888) 
1.894* 
(0.881) 
Post-materialism  -.510 
(0.295) 
- 0.427 
(0.314) 
- 0.246 
(0.373) 
-0.267 
(0.370) 
Interaction   2.516 
(3.129) 
1.632 
(2.930) 
1.513 
(2.908) 
% of Muslims    0.387 
(0.337) 
0.398 
(0.334) 
Democracy    0.016 
(0.25) 
0.014 
(0.025) 
GDP    - 0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
   1.083* 
(0.483) 
1.085* 
(0.480) 
Economic 
insecurity 
    0.291 
(0.222) 
      
      
Intercept 6.552*** 
(0.113) 
6.550*** 
(0.111) 
6.540*** 
(0.112) 
6.175*** 
(0.345) 
5.343*** 
(0.722) 
N 52 52 52 52 52 
𝑅2 (adjusted) 0.072 0.107 0.101 0.231 0.243 
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That said, the regressions were also run using post-materialism as a dummy variable instead 
and, here, when included, the interaction was significant at 93%, and cultural insecurity was 
not8. This may suggest that for cultural insecurity to have an increase in authoritarian attitudes 
the country must cross a certain post-materialist threshold.  
 
Table 3: Economic insecurity regression results 
Economic insecurity effect on authoritarian attitudes. Unstandardized B-coefficients. Standard 
error in parentheses. Dependent variable: Authoritarian attitudes index. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Economic 
insecurity 
 
0.222 
(0.253) 
0.269 
(0.251) 
0.223 
(0.249) 
0.251 
(0.225) 
0.248 
(0.217) 
Post-materialism  - 0.486 
(0.310) 
-0.351 
(0.319) 
-0.080 
(0.351) 
-0.239 
(0.349) 
Interaction   0.905 
(0.604) 
1.046 
(0.578) 
0.957 
(0.561) 
% of Muslims    0.060 
(0.338) 
0.241 
(0.339) 
Democracy    0.001 
(0.24) 
0.017 
(0.024) 
GDP    -0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
   1.312** 
(0.449) 
1.173** 
(0.469) 
Beck cultural 
insecurity* 
    1.710*** 
(0.848) 
      
      
Intercept 6.547*** 
(0.118) 
6.545*** 
(0.116) 
6.527*** 
(0.115) 
6.310*** 
(0.338) 
5.552*** 
(0.498) 
N 52 52 52 52 52 
𝑅2 (adjusted) -0.004 0.24 0.47 0.237 0.364 
 
* Denotes significance at 95%  
**Denotes significance at 98%  
*** Denotes significance at 99% 
 
Economic insecurity has only a weak effect on authoritarian attitudes, and was not significant 
at the 95% level in any of the models. Similar to the regressions with cultural insecurity, post-
materialism has a negative effect on authoritarian attitudes here. In terms of the interaction, 
economic insecurity in post-materialist countries has a weak positive effect, but this was not 
                                                     
8 For regression results using dummy variable see appendix 4 
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significant either. However, whilst this was not significant, the direction of the effect is contrary 
to the hypothesis. It was predicted that economic insecurity would have a stronger effect in 
materialist countries, thus a negative direction was expected. Further when running the 
regressions using the dummy variable, the interaction was significant in the 4th and 5th models, 
but not as strong as the interaction with cultural insecurity. The dummy regressions suggest that 
economic insecurity has a stronger effect in post-materialist countries past a certain threshold. 
Analysis and discussion 
Based on the results, cultural insecurity does seem to affect authoritarian values in countries 
regardless of their materialist status. Using the threshold format with a dummy interaction 
variable, cultural insecurity had a greater effect in post-materialist countries. Economic 
insecurity on the other hand did not have a significant effect on authoritarian attitudes, however, 
here the threshold format showed a significant effect with the interaction variable indicating 
that economic insecurity has a greater effect in post-materialist countries, albeit weaker than 
cultural insecurity. Thus, we have mixed results for the hypotheses. What can be claimed is that 
the second hypothesis was incorrect, economic insecurity does not affect authoritarian attitudes 
more in materialist countries. For the first hypothesis, there is evidence to suggest that cultural 
insecurity is a stronger predictor of authoritarian attitudes in both materialist and post-
materialist countries, and when crossing a certain level of post-materialism this effect is 
heightened, but past this, the effect does not necessarily increase as post-materialism increases.  
 
When looking at the continuous interaction variable of post-materialism which was not 
significant, it is possible that the disembedding of democracy is, as Brym argues, a reflection 
of the changing international system. With new global powers, such as China and Russia led 
by autocrats, the cultural dominance of democracy is threatened in both materialist and post-
materialist countries. Global risks such as terrorism, financial crises, and climate change for 
instance, can for individuals regardless of materialism status be a motivating factor for instating 
authoritarian leadership. This provides clearer responsibility and compensates for a lack of 
sovereignty and the interdependence of actors. To ensure social security for oneself in times of 
personal insecurity, creates external security through the regime.  
 
Economic Insecurity 
The results from the regressions using the dummy post- materialist variable gives some strength 
to the first hypothesis. However, it may also suggest that in post-materialist countries short term 
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fluctuations or worries have a greater effect on authoritarian attitudes whether these be 
economic or cultural. The variable used to measure economic insecurity, ‘worries about losing 
or not finding a job’ was significant in interaction with post-materialism for authoritarian 
attitudes. This could indicate that in a climate of neoliberalism, stable jobs have become more 
difficult to find, and that jobs also play a role in the self-actualization process. This may mean 
that this is not a true reflection of economic insecurity, but rather a reflection of 
individualization and the new role of work as not just a source of income but a creator of 
identity. If this indeed is the case, then worries about losing your job could also be an indication 
of concern about losing one’s identity. This fear in tandem with identity creation through work, 
could explain why in post-materialist countries those with such worries are more likely to view 
authoritarian alternatives as positive and as a source of security.  
 
On the other hand, dummy results for economic insecurity could also reflect growing inequality 
in post-materialist countries. Increased inequality per Alexander and Welzel (2017) has created 
a divergence in how quickly liberal emancipatory values develop across classes.  Individuals 
who are most concerned about losing or not finding jobs may also belong to the lowest 
economic classes. Given growing inequality, these individuals develop liberal values slower 
than those belonging to more economically secure classes. This may result in individuals who 
are left behind, both in terms of economic questions and moral values. These left behind and 
ostracized groups may have greater woes with the democratic system and thus be easier targets 
for illiberal populist messages. This could also possibly explain why economic insecurity in 
post-materialist countries is a greater predictor for authoritarian attitudes. In more materialist 
countries, inequality may not cause as stark of a divergence in moral attitudes. In post-
materialist countries however, economic insecurity may have a much greater effect on liberal 
values relative to those predominant in society.  
 
Cultural Insecurity 
The results could indicate that the increase in authoritarian attitudes is a recent effect of 
heightened cultural insecurity in post-materialist countries that has existed in materialist 
countries for longer. The results for ethnic fractionalization would suggest this, the variable was 
significant in both tests. Many post-materialist countries have experienced recent increased 
heterogeneity which may influence cultural insecurity whereas many materialist countries have 
been heterogeneous longer. That said, the data for the ethnic fractionalization variable is taken 
from 2003, whereas the data from the surveys is more recent. Possibly the effect of ethnic 
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fractionalization would even be a greater predictor for authoritarian attitudes today. Seeing that 
cultural insecurity was significant even when ethnic fractionalization was included in the 
models, there does seem to be an effect independent of possible increased heterogeneity, but 
testing with more current demographic data would strengthen the results.  
 
In terms of democratic backsliding, support for authoritarian alternatives is affected by cultural 
insecurity. However, it may be appropriate to understand the results through Greskowitz 
(2015); both relativism and worries about losing your job, may be symptoms of neoliberalism 
that increase the chances of the hollowing out of democracy. Somer and McCoy (2018) suggest 
that polarization has weakened democratic support by creating different expectations for 
democracy. The results here may be tapping into a similar logic. Moral relativism; the 
acceptance of bribery, avoiding fares and cheating on taxes could suggest a relativism with 
regards to the importance of civil liberties and democratic systems. Possibly individuals who 
are highly relativistic can view some groups as more important to protect than others. They may 
have different expectations for whose rights democratic institutions are protecting, in extension 
this may explain why those who are highly relative may believe authoritarian alternatives would 
be better at representing and protecting personal interests. For Beck, this would be an indicator 
of their risk consciousness triggered by cultural insecurity. Perceiving cultural insecurity 
through the loosening of boundaries could motivate support for authoritarian alternatives which 
can draw new boundaries that protect specific personal interests. Possibly, we are seeing a 
process of disembedding and embedding of regime types through cultural insecurity. 
 
The strength of the cultural insecurity variable also suggests that this is indeed not a backlash 
which is increasing authoritarian support, individualization is part of the process of post-
materialism; relativism is included in the secular index of WVS because it is part of a country’s 
development from survival and traditional values. This would strengthen the idea that post-
materialism is not on its own a guarantee for democratic support, but as mentioned in the theory, 
is multi-faceted, which can, under certain conditions, trigger support for authoritarian attitudes.  
 
Future Research 
The results indicate that cultural insecurity influences authoritarian attitudes more so than 
economic insecurity and that there is some evidence to suggest that the effects of insecurity; 
both cultural and economic is heightened when a country is more post-materialist. However, 
for more clear, robust results, future research could use time-series data. Values are slow 
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moving and changes in the early 2000’s may only be reflected in values today, thus this would 
be beneficial for establishing clearer causality. Further as Foa and Mounk found, younger 
people today are more supportive of authoritarian attitudes. Cultural and economic insecurity 
may be clearer amongst youth, based on Inglehart’s socialization and scarcity hypothesis, this 
would also make sense. Youth today who grow up in a greater risk society will also be 
socialized with greater cultural insecurity and thus the effect on authoritarian attitudes may be 
greater. In combination with time-series data, it would be possible to look at how young cohorts 
have been affected in different points of time which could tell us if the effect of cultural 
insecurity is a new phenomenon, if it is limited to youth today, and consider if this is tied to 
changes in ethnic diversity.  Hierarchal multilevel models can also shed light on whether the 
effects of cultural insecurity occur on an individual level for post-materialists instead of country 
aggregates. With individual level data, the effects of social pressures highlighted by Welzel, 
Kratsoia and Oschpokvo (2017) and Welzel (2010), can be considered. In countries with 
widespread post-materialism, post-materialists on an individual level may express cultural 
insecurity differently than post-materialists in materialist countries. This would be related to 
which values are amplified and emphasized in the society, and which values are predicted to 
further one’s social status.  
Conclusion 
This thesis sought to explore how economic insecurity and cultural insecurity affected 
authoritarian attitudes in materialist and post-materialist countries.  The first hypothesis was 
that in post-materialist countries, where cultural values dominate, cultural insecurity would be 
a greater explanant than economic insecurity for authoritarian attitudes. The second hypothesis 
was that in materialist countries, where economic values dominate, economic insecurity would 
be a greater explanant than cultural insecurity for authoritarian attitudes.  
 
Using modernization theory based on Inglehart’s research as well as Beck’s theories on 
reflexive modernization and the risk society, it was argued that post-materialism has been 
treated as a phenomenon that is independent of the context in which it exists. Modernization 
theory stipulates that post-materialist values conducive to democratic development are created 
through existential security. For modernization theory, this is economic security and it allows 
individuals to place value in questions that are cultural rather than economic. However, what is 
not discussed in modernization theory is what possible new sources of existential threat post-
materialist societies are vulnerable to, and whether new forms of existential insecurity can 
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affect democratic values. With the help of Beck’s world risk, the concept of cultural insecurity 
was formed. Through globalization and the blurring of boundaries in most aspects of life, 
whether this be political, economic, or social, there are less certain truths in society. It was 
argued that this can create a new insecurity that post-materialists, who identify themselves 
through culture rather than economy, are more susceptible to feel. This cultural insecurity may 
then lead individuals who are faced with a new existential threat relating to their identity to 
form ‘risk consciousness’. That is, to ensure their own security they will be willing to infringe 
on civil liberties.  
 
To test the hypotheses OLS regressions were conducted using WVS survey data which 
measured authoritarian attitudes. Cultural insecurity and economic insecurity were tested 
separately and an interaction term was formed with post-materialism for each independent 
variable. The relationship was tested twice, once using a continuous interaction variable, and 
once using a binary materialist/post-materialist variable. The results showed that cultural 
insecurity had a significant effect on authoritarian attitudes for both materialist and post-
materialist countries, and the results using the binary interaction showed that the effect of 
cultural insecurity was stronger in post-materialist countries. Taken together, it was understood 
that past a level of materialism, cultural insecurity has a stronger effect on authoritarian 
attitudes, but that this effect did not increase with increasing post-materialism past a certain 
threshold. With regards to economic insecurity, when using a continuous interaction variable, 
the effect was not significant for materialist or post-materialist countries. The effect was 
significant however when using the dummy interaction, with post-materialist countries being 
more affected by economic insecurity. The results suggest that the first hypothesis was correct, 
and the second hypothesis was not. To attain better, more robust results, a stronger measure for 
cultural insecurity and economic insecurity can be formed, and time series and generational 
data may be more appropriate to use. Overall the results here suggest that questions such as 
cultural insecurity may be of relevance for future research on democratic backsliding.   
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Appendix 1: Included Countries 
List of countries included in dataset 
 
Algeria China Hong Kong Lebanon Pakistan Slovenia Turkey 
Argentina Colombia India  Libya Peru South 
Africa 
Ukraine 
Armenia Cyprus Iraq Malaysia Philippines Spain United 
States 
Australia Ecuador Japan Mexico Poland Sweden Uruguay 
Azerbaijan Estonia Jordan Netherlands Romania Taiwan Uzbekistan 
Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan New 
Zealand 
Russia Thailand Yemen 
Brazil Germany Korea, S Nigeria Rwanda Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 
Zimbabwe 
Chile Ghana Kyrgyzstan Palestine Singapore Tunisia  
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Appendix 2: Variable Questions  
Source: WVS 2010-2013 Official Questionnaire 
Dependent variable: Authoritarian attitudes 
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a 
way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly 
bad or very bad way of governing this country? (Read out and code one answer for each):  
 
Very good = 1, Fairly good = 2, Fairly bad = 3, Very bad = 4* 
 
V127. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections  
V128. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for 
the country  
V129. Having the army rule.  
 
*Variable recoded in authors dataset so that Very bad = 1 and Very good = 4.  
 
Independent Variable: Cultural insecurity 
Relativism  
Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out and code one answer 
for each statement):  
 
Scale from 1-10: Never justifiable = 1, Always justifiable = 10 
V199. Avoiding a fare on public transport 
V201. Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 
V202. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 
 
Independent Variable: Economic Insecurity 
To what degree are you worried about the following situations?  
Very much = 1, A good deal = 2, Not much = 3, Not at all = 4* 
V181. Losing my job or not finding a job 
 
*Recoded as Very much = 4, Not at all = 1  
 
Moderator: 12 item Post-materialism 
V60. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. 
On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would 
you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? (Code one 
answer only under “first choice”):  
 
V61. And which would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second 
choice”)  
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- A high level of economic growth 
- Making sure this country has strong defense forces 
- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their 
communities  
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful 
 
V62. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most 
important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):  
V63. And which would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second 
choice”):  
 
- Maintaining order in the nation  
- Giving people more say in important government decisions  
- Fighting rising prices  
- Protecting freedom of speech 
 
V64. Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (Code one 
answer only under “first choice”):  
V65. And what would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second 
choice”): 
 
- A stable economy  
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society  
- Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money 
- The fight against crime 
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Appendix 3: Output tables (continuous interaction) 
Output table: Cultural Insecurity 
 
a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collineari
ty 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Toleranc
e 
1 (Constant) 6.552 .113  57.896 .000  
relativismc 1.976 .880 .300 2.245 .029 1.000 
2 (Constant) 6.550 .111  59.004 .000  
relativismc 2.111 .867 .320 2.435 .019 .992 
postmaterialism_c -.510 .295 -.228 -1.730 .090 .992 
3 (Constant) 6.540 .112  58.281 .000  
relativismc 2.256 .889 .342 2.539 .014 .951 
postmaterialism_c -.427 .314 -.190 -1.361 .180 .883 
relativismc_postm
atc 
2.516 3.129 .115 .804 .425 .847 
4 (Constant) 6.175 .345  17.891 .000  
relativismc 1.918 .888 .291 2.160 .036 .814 
postmaterialism_c -.246 .372 -.110 -.661 .512 .537 
relativismc_postm
atc 
1.632 2.930 .075 .557 .580 .826 
ethnicfrac 1.083 .483 .291 2.240 .030 .878 
muslim_pop .387 .337 .177 1.149 .257 .625 
polity .016 .025 .111 .650 .519 .504 
GDP -.011 .008 -.191 -1.351 .183 .739 
5 (Constant) 5.343 .722  7.405 .000  
relativismc 1.894 .881 .288 2.149 .037 .814 
postmaterialism_c -.267 .370 -.119 -.722 .474 .536 
relativismc_postm
atc 
1.513 2.908 .069 .520 .605 .825 
ethnicfrac 1.085 .480 .291 2.262 .029 .878 
muslim_pop .398 .334 .182 1.191 .240 .625 
polity .014 .025 .097 .570 .571 .502 
GDP -.011 .008 -.195 -1.385 .173 .739 
economicinsecurit
y 
.291 .222 .160 1.309 .197 .976 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
VIF 
1 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.000 
2 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.008 
postmaterialism_c 1.008 
3 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.052 
postmaterialism_c 1.132 
relativismc_postmatc 1.181 
4 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.228 
postmaterialism_c 1.862 
relativismc_postmatc 1.210 
ethnicfrac 1.139 
muslim_pop 1.599 
polity 1.983 
GDP 1.353 
5 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.228 
postmaterialism_c 1.866 
relativismc_postmatc 1.211 
ethnicfrac 1.139 
muslim_pop 1.600 
polity 1.991 
GDP 1.354 
economicinsecurity 1.025 
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Output table: Economic Insecurity 
 
a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collineari
ty 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Toleranc
e 
1 (Constant) 6.547 .118  55.554 .000  
economicinsecurity_c .222 .253 .122 .877 .384 1.000 
2 (Constant) 6.545 .116  56.325 .000  
economicinsecurity_c .269 .251 .148 1.074 .288 .985 
postmaterialism_c -.486 .310 -.217 -1.571 .122 .985 
3 (Constant) 6.527 .115  56.550 .000  
economicinsecurity_c .233 .249 .128 .935 .355 .976 
postmaterialism_c -.351 .319 -.157 -1.101 .276 .906 
postmatC_economici
nsecC 
.905 .604 .212 1.498 .140 .916 
4 (Constant) 6.310 .338  18.654 .000  
economicinsecurity_c .251 .225 .138 1.116 .270 .962 
postmaterialism_c -.080 .351 -.036 -.228 .821 .599 
postmatC_economici
nsecC 
1.046 .578 .245 1.810 .077 .804 
ethnicfrac 1.312 .479 .352 2.736 .009 .886 
muslim_pop .060 .338 .028 .178 .859 .617 
polity .001 .024 .009 .054 .957 .566 
GDP -.015 .008 -.259 -1.856 .070 .754 
5 (Constant) 5.552 .498  11.140 .000  
economicinsecurity_c .248 .217 .136 1.141 .260 .961 
postmaterialism_c -.239 .349 -.107 -.685 .497 .568 
postmatC_economici
nsecC 
.957 .561 .224 1.707 .095 .799 
ethnicfrac 1.173 .469 .315 2.501 .016 .867 
muslim_pop .241 .339 .110 .710 .481 .574 
polity .017 .024 .114 .693 .492 .509 
GDP -.012 .008 -.217 -1.587 .120 .736 
RELATIVISM_mean 1.710 .848 .259 2.016 .050 .829 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
VIF 
1 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 1.000 
2 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 1.015 
postmaterialism_c 1.015 
3 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 1.025 
postmaterialism_c 1.103 
postmatC_economicinsecC 1.091 
4 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 1.040 
postmaterialism_c 1.670 
postmatC_economicinsecC 1.244 
ethnicfrac 1.129 
muslim_pop 1.621 
polity 1.767 
GDP 1.326 
5 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 1.040 
postmaterialism_c 1.760 
postmatC_economicinsecC 1.252 
ethnicfrac 1.154 
muslim_pop 1.743 
polity 1.965 
GDP 1.358 
RELATIVISM_mean 1.206 
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Appendix 4: Output tables (dummy interaction) 
Output table: Cultural Insecurity 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
t Sig. 
Collinea
rity 
Statistic
s 
B Std. Error Beta 
Toleranc
e 
1 (Constant) 6.552 .113  57.896 .000  
relativismc 1.976 .880 .300 2.245 .029 1.000 
2 (Constant) 6.661 .153  43.596 .000  
relativismc 1.995 .879 .303 2.269 .028 1.000 
postmatcdummy -.242 .227 -.142 -1.065 .292 1.000 
3 (Constant) 6.658 .149  44.709 .000  
relativismc .706 1.091 .107 .647 .521 .616 
postmatcdummy -.245 .221 -.144 -1.106 .274 1.000 
dummyrelativismc_
postmatc 
3.361 1.762 .316 1.907 .062 .616 
4 (Constant) 6.286 .326  19.300 .000  
relativismc .558 1.030 .085 .541 .591 .574 
postmatcdummy .007 .233 .004 .030 .976 .747 
dummyrelativismc_
postmatc 
3.006 1.614 .283 1.863 .069 .611 
ethnicfrac .971 .475 .261 2.047 .047 .864 
muslim_pop .441 .326 .201 1.351 .184 .634 
polity .009 .023 .064 .407 .686 .575 
GDP -.013 .008 -.234 -1.770 .083 .803 
5 (Constant) 5.473 .690  7.931 .000  
relativismc .553 1.022 .084 .542 .591 .574 
postmatcdummy -.049 .235 -.029 -.209 .836 .723 
dummyrelativismc_
postmatc 
3.007 1.600 .283 1.879 .067 .611 
ethnicfrac .958 .471 .257 2.035 .048 .864 
muslim_pop .446 .323 .204 1.379 .175 .633 
polity .008 .023 .057 .371 .713 .574 
GDP -.013 .008 -.235 -1.795 .079 .803 
economicinsecurity .293 .219 .161 1.334 .189 .947 
a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
VIF 
1 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.000 
2 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.000 
postmatcdummy 1.000 
3 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.623 
postmatcdummy 1.000 
dummyrelativismc_postmatc 1.623 
4 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.741 
postmatcdummy 1.340 
dummyrelativismc_postmatc 1.638 
ethnicfrac 1.157 
muslim_pop 1.579 
polity 1.740 
GDP 1.246 
5 (Constant)  
relativismc 1.741 
postmatcdummy 1.384 
dummyrelativismc_postmatc 1.638 
ethnicfrac 1.157 
muslim_pop 1.579 
polity 1.741 
GDP 1.246 
economicinsecurity 1.056 
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Output table: Economic Insecurity 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collineari
ty 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Toleranc
e 
1 (Constant) 6.547 .118  55.554 .000  
economicinsecurity_c .222 .253 .122 .877 .384 1.000 
2 (Constant) 6.678 .160  41.843 .000  
economicinsecurity_c .292 .258 .161 1.132 .263 .949 
postmatcdummy -.293 .242 -.172 -1.214 .230 .949 
3 (Constant) 6.640 .158  42.097 .000  
economicinsecurity_c -.217 .382 -.119 -.568 .573 .416 
postmatcdummy -.309 .237 -.182 -1.306 .198 .948 
postmatdummyc_x_e
coninsecC 
.906 .509 .371 1.778 .082 .421 
4 (Constant) 6.346 .329  19.293 .000  
economicinsecurity_c -.283 .353 -.156 -.803 .426 .381 
postmatcdummy -.056 .241 -.033 -.234 .816 .717 
postmatdummyc_x_e
coninsecC 
1.016 .479 .416 2.119 .040 .373 
ethnicfrac 1.252 .472 .336 2.653 .011 .895 
muslim_pop .131 .324 .060 .404 .688 .656 
polity .002 .023 .017 .109 .913 .603 
GDP -.017 .008 -.296 -2.208 .032 .798 
5 (Constant) 5.685 .461  12.325 .000  
economicinsecurity_c -.276 .342 -.152 -.806 .425 .381 
postmatcdummy -.107 .235 -.063 -.455 .651 .709 
postmatdummyc_x_e
coninsecC 
.999 .464 .409 2.151 .037 .373 
ethnicfrac 1.091 .464 .293 2.350 .023 .868 
muslim_pop .301 .326 .137 .924 .360 .611 
polity .015 .023 .100 .642 .524 .560 
GDP -.015 .007 -.270 -2.065 .045 .790 
RELATIVISM_mean 1.634 .823 .248 1.986 .053 .865 
 
a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
VIF 
1 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 1.000 
2 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 1.053 
postmatcdummy 1.053 
3 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 2.406 
postmatcdummy 1.055 
postmatdummyc_x_econinsecC 2.374 
4 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 2.623 
postmatcdummy 1.395 
postmatdummyc_x_econinsecC 2.683 
ethnicfrac 1.117 
muslim_pop 1.525 
polity 1.657 
GDP 1.253 
5 (Constant)  
economicinsecurity_c 2.623 
postmatcdummy 1.411 
postmatdummyc_x_econinsecC 2.684 
ethnicfrac 1.152 
muslim_pop 1.638 
polity 1.786 
GDP 1.266 
RELATIVISM_mean 1.156 
